UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION RECEIVED

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| |) | DEBRA P. HACKETT, CLK U.S. DISTRICT COURT CASE NO. 2:050R-287-MHTIACSO |
| -VS- |) | |
| |) | uwc |
| JENNIE MASSEY | j j | |

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Comes Now the Defendant, by and through her attorneys of record, Gwendolyn Thomas Kennedy and Glenn D. Zimmerman, and respectfully requests that the following Jury Instructions be given to the jury in the above case.

Respectfully submitted on this the 31st day of January, 2007.

GWENDOLYN THOMAS KENNEDY GLENN D. ZIMMERMAN Attorneys for the Defendant

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2.1 Duty to Follow Instructions Presumption of Innocence

You must make your decision only on the basis of the testimony and other evidence presented here during the trial; and you must not be influenced in any way by either sympathy or prejudice for or against the Defendant or the Government.

You must also follow the law as I explain it to you whether you agree with that law or not; and you must follow all of my instructions as a whole. You may not single out, or disregard, any of the Court's instructions on the law.

The indictment or formal charge against any Defendant is not evidence of guilt. Indeed, every Defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The law does not require a Defendant to prove innocence or to produce any evidence at all. The Government has the burden of proving a Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so you must find that Defendant not guilty.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (The due process clause protects all criminal defendants "against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."); see also <u>Harvell v. Nagle</u>, 58 F.3d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir. 1995), <u>reh'g denied</u>, 70 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1995).

2.2

Duty to Follow Instructions Presumption of Innocence (When Any Defendant Does Not Testify)

You must make your decision only on the basis of the testimony and other evidence presented here during the trial; and you must not be influenced in any way by either sympathy or prejudice for or against the Defendant or the Government.

You must also follow the law as I explain it to you whether you agree with that law or not; and you must follow all of my instructions as a whole. You may not single out, or disregard, any of the Court's instructions on the law.

The indictment or formal charge against any Defendant is not evidence of guilt. Indeed, every Defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The law does not require a Defendant to prove innocence or to produce any evidence at all; and if a Defendant elects not to testify, you should not consider that in any way during your deliberations. The Government has the burden of proving a Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so you must find that Defendant not guilty.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1539 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 842, 113 S.Ct. 127, 121 L.Ed.2d 82 (1992), Defendant who does not testify is entitled to instruction that no inference may be drawn from that election; see also United States v. Veltman, 6 F.3d 1483, 1493 (11th Cir. 1993) (Court was "troubled" by "absence of instruction on the presumption of innocence at the beginning of the trial Although the Court charged the jury on the presumption before they retired to deliberate, we believe it extraordinary for a trial to progress to that stage with nary a mention of this jurisprudential bedrock.")

3 Definition of Reasonable Doubt

Thus, while the Government's burden of proof is a strict or heavy burden, it is not necessary that a Defendant's guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt. It is only required that the Government's proof exclude any "reasonable doubt" concerning the Defendant's guilt.

A "reasonable doubt" is a real doubt, based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs. If you are convinced that the Defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, say so. If you are not convinced, say so.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

<u>United States v. Daniels</u>, 986 F.2d 451 (11th Cir. 1993), <u>cert. denied</u>, 114 S.Ct. 1615, 128 L.Ed.2d 342 (1994) approves this definition and instruction concerning reasonable doubt; see also <u>United States v. Morris</u>, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981); <u>Victor v. Nebraska</u>, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (discussing "reasonable doubt" definition and instruction).

4.1 Consideration of the Evidence Direct and Circumstantial Argument of Counsel

As I said earlier, you must consider only the evidence that I have admitted in the case. The term "evidence" includes the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits admitted in the record. Remember that anything the lawyers say is not evidence in the case. It is your own recollection and interpretation of the evidence that controls. What the lawyers say is not binding upon you.

In considering the evidence you may make deductions and reach conclusions which reason and common sense lead you to make; and you should not be concerned about whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. "Direct evidence" is the testimony of one who asserts actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eye witness. "Circumstantial evidence" is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances tending to prove, or disprove, any fact in dispute. The law makes no distinction between the weight you may give to either direct or circumstantial evidence.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

<u>United States v. Clark</u>, 506 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1975), <u>cert. denied</u>, 421 U.S. 967, 95 S.Ct. 1957, 44 L.Ed.2d 454 (1975) approves the substance of this instruction concerning the lack of distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence; see also <u>United States v. Barnette</u>, 800 F.2d 1558, 1566 (11th Cir. 1986), <u>reh'g denied</u>, 807 F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1986), <u>cert. denied</u>, 480 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 1578, 94 L.Ed.2d 769 (1987) (noting that the "test for evaluating circumstantial evidence is the same as in evaluating direct evidence") (citing <u>United States v. Henderson</u>, 693 F.2d 1028, 1030 (11th Cir. 1983)).

<u>United States v. Granville</u>, 716 F.2d 819, 822 (11th Cir. 1983) notes that the jury was correctly instructed that the arguments of counsel should not be considered as evidence (citing <u>United States v. Phillips</u>, 664 F.2d 971, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also <u>United States v. Siegel</u>, 587 F.2d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1979).

4.2 Consideration of the Evidence, Direct and Circumstantial - - Argument of Counsel Comments by the Court

As I said earlier, you must consider only the evidence that I have admitted in the case. The term "evidence" includes the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits admitted in the record. Remember that anything the lawyers say is not evidence in the case. It is your own recollection and interpretation of the evidence that controls. What the lawyers say is not binding upon you. Also, you should not assume from anything I may have said that I have any opinion concerning any of the issues in this case. Except for my instructions to you on the law, you should disregard anything I may have said during the trial in arriving at your own decision concerning the facts.

In considering the evidence you may make deductions and reach conclusions which reason and common sense lead you to make; and you should not be concerned about whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. "Direct evidence" is the testimony of one who asserts actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eye witness. "Circumstantial evidence" is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances tending to prove, or disprove, any fact in dispute. The law makes no distinction between the weight you may give to either direct or circumstantial evidence.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

<u>United States v. Clark</u>, 506 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1975), <u>cert. denied</u>, 421 U.S. 967, 95 S.Ct. 1957, 44 L.Ed.2d 454 (1975) approves the substance of this instruction concerning the lack of distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence; see also <u>United States v. Barnette</u>, 800 F.2d 1558, 1566 (11th Cir. 1986), <u>reh'g denied</u>, 807 F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1986), <u>cert. denied</u>, 480 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 1578, 94 L.Ed.2d 769 (1987) (noting that the "test for evaluating circumstantial evidence is the same as in evaluating direct evidence") (citing <u>United States v. Henderson</u>, 693 F.2d 1028, 1030 (11th Cir. 1983)).

<u>United States v. Hope</u>, 714 F.2d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 1983) ("A trial judge may comment upon the evidence as long as he instructs the jury that it is the sole judge of the facts and that it is not bound by his comments and as long as the comments are not so highly prejudicial that an instruction to that effect cannot cure the error.") (citing <u>United States v. Buchanan</u>, 585 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1978)).

<u>United States v. Granville</u>, 716 F.2d 819, 822 (11th Cir. 1983) notes that the jury was correctly instructed that the arguments of counsel should not be considered as evidence (citing <u>United States v. Phillips</u>, 664 F.2d 971, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also <u>United States v. Siegel</u>, 587 F.2d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1979).

5 Credibility of Witnesses

Now, in saying that you must <u>consider</u> all of the evidence, I do not mean that you must <u>accept</u> all of the evidence as true or accurate. You should decide whether you believe what each witness had to say, and how important that testimony was. In making that decision you may believe or disbelieve any witness, in whole or in part. Also, the number of witnesses testifying concerning any particular dispute is not controlling.

In deciding whether you believe or do not believe any witness I suggest that you ask yourself a few questions: Did the witness impress you as one who was telling the truth? Did the witness have any particular reason not to tell the truth? Did the witness have a personal interest in the outcome of the case? Did the witness seem to have a good memory? Did the witness have the opportunity and ability to observe accurately the things he or she testified about? Did the witness appear to understand the questions clearly and answer them directly? Did the witness's testimony differ from other testimony or other evidence?

6.1 Impeachment - - Inconsistent Statement

You should also ask yourself whether there was evidence tending to prove that a witness testified falsely concerning some important fact; or, whether there was evidence that at some other time a witness said or did something, or failed to say or do something, which was different from the testimony the witness gave before you during the trial.

You should keep in mind, of course, that a simple mistake by a witness does not necessarily mean that the witness was not telling the truth as he or she remembers it, because people naturally tend to forget some things or remember other things inaccurately. So, if a witness has made a misstatement, you need to consider whether it was simply an innocent lapse of memory or an intentional falsehood; and the significance of that may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or with only an unimportant detail.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

<u>United States v. D'Antignac</u>, 628 F.2d 428, 435-36 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980), <u>cert</u>. <u>denied</u>, 450 U.S. 967, 101 S.Ct. 1485, 67 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981) approved instruction (used in conjunction with Basic Instruction 5 and Special Instruction 2.1 as befitted the facts of that case). See also <u>United States v. McDonald</u>, 620 F.2d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 1980), and <u>United States v. Soloman</u>, 856 F.2d 1572, 1578 (11th Cir. 1988), <u>reh'g denied</u>, 863 F.2d 890 (1988), <u>cert</u>. <u>denied</u>, 489 U.S. 1070, 109 S.Ct. 1352, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989).

6.2 Impeachment Inconsistent Statement and Felony Conviction

You should also ask yourself whether there was evidence tending to prove that a witness testified falsely concerning some important fact; or, whether there was evidence that at some other time a witness said or did something, or failed to say or do something, which was different from the testimony the witness gave before you during the trial.

The fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony offense, or a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, is another factor you may consider in deciding whether you believe that witness.

You should keep in mind, of course, that a simple mistake by a witness does not necessarily mean that the witness was not telling the truth as he or she remembers it, because people naturally tend to forget some things or remember other things inaccurately. So, if a witness has made a misstatement, you need to consider whether it was simply an innocent lapse of memory or an intentional falsehood; and the significance of that may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or with only an unimportant detail.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

<u>United States v. Solomon</u>, 856 F.2d 1572, 1578 (11th Cir. 1988), <u>reh'g denied</u>, 863 F.2d 890 (1988), <u>cert</u>. <u>denied</u>, 489 U.S. 1070, 109 S.Ct. 1352, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989) approved this instruction.

6.3 Impeachment Inconsistent Statement (Defendant Testifies With No Felony Conviction)

You should also ask yourself whether there was evidence tending to prove that a witness testified falsely concerning some important fact; or, whether there was evidence that at some other time a witness said or did something, or failed to say or do something, which was different from the testimony the witness gave before you during the trial.

You should keep in mind, of course, that a simple mistake by a witness does not necessarily mean that the witness was not telling the truth as he or she remembers it, because people naturally tend to forget some things or remember other things inaccurately. So, if a witness has made a misstatement, you need to consider whether it was simply an innocent lapse of memory or an intentional falsehood; and the significance of that may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or with only an unimportant detail.

A Defendant has a right not to testify. If a Defendant does testify, however, you should decide in the same way as that of any other witness whether you believe the Defendant's testimony.

6.5 Impeachment Inconsistent Statement and Felony Conviction (Defendant Testifies With No Felony Conviction)

You should also ask yourself whether there was evidence tending to prove that a witness testified falsely concerning some important fact; or, whether there was evidence that at some other time a witness said or did something, or failed to say or do something, which was different from the testimony the witness gave before you during the trial.

The fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony offense, or a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, is another factor you may consider in deciding whether you believe that witness.

You should keep in mind, of course, that a simple mistake by a witness does not necessarily mean that the witness was not telling the truth as he or she remembers it, because people naturally tend to forget some things or remember other things inaccurately. So, if a witness has made a misstatement, you need to consider whether it was simply an innocent lapse of memory or an intentional falsehood; and the significance of that may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or with only an unimportant detail.

A Defendant has a right not to testify. If a Defendant does testify, however, you should decide in the same way as that of any other witness whether you believe the Defendant's testimony.

6.7 Impeachment Bad Reputation (or Opinion) Concerning Truthfulness (May Be Used with 6.1 - 6.6)

There may also be evidence tending to show that a witness has a bad reputation for truthfulness in the community where the witness resides, or has recently resided; or that others have an unfavorable opinion of the truthfulness of the witness.

You may consider those matters also in deciding whether to believe or disbelieve such a witness.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

Rule 608. [F.R.E.] Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness

(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. - - The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character

is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.

See <u>United States v. Watson</u>, 669 F.2d 1374, 1381-1383 (11th Cir. 1982) distinguishing between reputation witnesses and personal opinion witnesses, and finding error in the exclusion of opinion testimony.

See also, Special Instruction 11, Character Evidence (relating to evidence of the character of the accused offered under Rule 404(a)(1), F.R.E.), and the Annotations and Comments following that instruction.

Case 2:06-cr-00287-MHT-CSC Document 22 Filed 01/31/2007 Page 14 of 17 DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 12

10.1 Caution - - Punishment (Single Defendant - - Single Count)

I caution you, members of the Jury, that you are here to determine from the evidence in this case whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty. The Defendant is on trial only for the specific offense alleged in the indictment.

Also, the question of punishment should never be considered by the jury in any way in deciding the case. If the Defendant is convicted the matter of punishment is for the Judge alone to determine later.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991) approved this instruction.

Duty to Deliberate

Any verdict you reach in the jury room, whether guilty or not guilty, must be unanimous. In other words, to return a verdict you must all agree. Your deliberations will be secret; you will never have to explain your verdict to anyone.

It is your duty as jurors to discuss the case with one another in an effort to reach agreement if you can do so. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after full consideration of the evidence with the other members of the jury. While you are discussing the case do not hesitate to reexamine your own opinion and change your mind if you become convinced that you were wrong. But do not give up your honest beliefs solely because the others think differently or merely to get the case over with.

Remember, that in a very real way you are judges - - judges of the facts. Your only interest is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case.

12 Verdict

When you go to the jury room you should first select one of your members to act as your foreperson. The foreperson will preside over your deliberations and will speak for you here in court.

A form of verdict has been prepared for your convenience.

[Explain verdict]

You will take the verdict form to the jury room and when you have reached unanimous agreement you will have your foreperson fill in the verdict form, date and sign it, and then return to the courtroom.

If you should desire to communicate with me at any time, please write down your message or question and pass the note to the marshal who will bring it to my attention. I will then respond as promptly as possible, either in writing or by having you returned to the courtroom so that I can address you orally. I caution you, however, with regard to any message or question you might send, that you should not tell me your numerical division at the time.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

<u>United States v. Norton</u>, 867 F.2d 1354, 1365-66 (11th Cir. 1989), <u>cert. denied</u>, 491 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3192, 105 L.Ed.2d 701 (1989) and 493 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 200, 107 L.Ed.2d 154 (1989) notes that the Court should not inquire about, or disclose, numerical division of the jury during deliberations but states that "[r]eversal may not be necessary even where the trial judge undertakes the inquiry and thereafter follows it with an <u>Allen</u> charge, absent a showing that either incident or a combination of the two was inherently coercive." Also, <u>United States v. Brokemond</u>, 959 F.2d 206, 209 (11th Cir. 1992) approved this instruction. See also <u>United States v. Cook</u>, 586 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1978), <u>reh'g denied</u>, 589 F.2d 1114 (1979), <u>cert. denied</u>, 442 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 2821, 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

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| V. |) | CASE NO. 2:06CR287-MHT |
| |) | |
| |) | |
| JENNIE MASSEY |) | |

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 31, 2007, I filed with the clerk of the Court the foregoing document, and copies to the Assistant United States Attorney, Hon. Kent Brunson, by U.S. Mail, postage pre paid and properly addressed.

Respectfully Submitted

GLENN D. ZIMMERMAN

Attorneys for the Defendant Jennie Massey

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